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Abstract 
Serious discussion about controlling the petroleum industry requires analysis of the balance of 
power between corporations, states and social movements. The article examines the “toxic 
hegemony” constructed by corporations and the state and explores two related movement alliances 
aimed at controlling the industry, in Ogoniland (Niger Delta) and Erris (NW Ireland). It asks how we 
can understand the relationship between states and petroleum interests and how movements can 
challenge this; examines the goals and operation of state repression and movement strategies to 
contain this repression; and concludes with a discussion of the wider chances of movement success 
beyond the local. 
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Introduction: how can David defeat Goliath? i 
Discussing the need to control the petroleum industry and possible mechanisms for doing so – 
without a serious consideration of power relations between corporations, states and popular 
movements – is academic in the pejorative sense, often representing an expression of despair about 
the ecological future and the possibility for genuine social control of fossil fuels. True, at first sight 
the industry – whose major corporations have larger economies than both states considered here – 
might seem beyond any “mere human” control. Yet if Goliath usually defeats David, on occasion 
David wins; and one role of research may be to indicate the conditions under which a better 
outcome is possible. As Raymond Williams observes, “To be truly radical is to make hope possible 
rather than despair convincing” (1989: 118). 
Consider three examples. From the early 1970s a Norwegian oil policy which had hitherto largely 
colluded with the industry set itself the ambitious goal of bringing it under control for the social 
good. So successful was this strategy that the Norwegian oil fund is now one of the world’s largest 
investors and Norway has become an international byword for the social control of petroleum – 
even if more recently this policy has been increasingly undermined.  
In the 1970s and 1980s, large-scale direct action social movements against nuclear power across the 
global North led not only to its defeat in a number of states (including Ireland) but also raised the 
costs of building plants, such that the industry was set back for 30 years, with recent comeback 
attempts less than overwhelming. 
Thirdly, in recent years what were once critical science discourses allied to social movements – 
notably sustainable development and climate change – have become mainstream aspects of the 
global political agenda, which major industrial states pay at least lip-service to and which may serve 
as points of leverage for more critical economic and ecological policies. 
My point is not to celebrate any of these ambiguous outcomes as simple victories. What I want to 
observe is, firstly, that these were achieved in the teeth of bitter opposition by major corporations 
and powerful states; it is by no means impossible to defeat Goliath, even if movements “fight and 
lose the battle, and the thing that they fought for comes about in spite of their defeat, and when it 
comes turns out not to be what they meant, and other [people] have to fight for what they meant 
under another name” (Morris 1886). 
Secondly, these represent three very different strategies: Norway a left social democracy, with 
movements firmly institutionalized within a reforming state; resistance to nuclear power one of the 
first flowerings of left-libertarian (grassroots, bottom-up) movement politics after 1968; and the 
changing of official discourse an outcome of NGO politics in these neo-liberal end times. Whatever 
other distinctions we might make between these strategies, then, the potential for effective 
outcomes against toxic hegemony is not the property of one movement approach alone. Given the 
“ecology of knowledges” underlying global movements for change (de Sousa Santos 2006), and the 
likelihood that movements in different places and contexts will adopt different strategies, it is no 
bad thing that all may have some possibility of winning. 
 
Understanding and defeating toxic hegemony 
Understanding and tackling “toxic capitalism”, as in this issue’s title, entails attention to the power 
relationships which underpin it, what for these purposes I will call “toxic hegemony”. By this I mean 
the institutionalization of “alliances for growth” between ecologically destructive industries, 
multinationals and states, backed up not only by supportive media and professional expertise but 
also by much wider coalitions of popular forces, whether organized as consumers, as right-wing 
opinion politics, as growth-centric trade unions, or as popular demands for development. Following 
Gramsci (1971), I understand hegemony as entailing (1) “theoretical and directive [organizing] 
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leadership” by elites defining a conscious energy strategy, as distinct from backroom conspiracies for 
resource acquisition etc.; (2) consent to this leadership by a wide range of subaltern groups who see 
some of their needs as met by this strategy; (3) the coercion of other social groups who oppose this 
strategy or whose consent is not worth bargaining for.ii  
Thinking in this way – politically, rather than focusing on the scale of energy corporations or the 
brutality of state repression alone - makes it possible to conceptualise the conditions for defeating 
Goliath. Coercion is not the opposite of consent; rather, the consent of some is required for the 
successful coercion of others (Cox forthcoming), which is why legitimacy is a central battleground for 
movements facing state violence. Similarly, corporations’ capacity to grow and acquire power is 
fundamentally dependent on their alliances with supportive states and (as Norway shows) can be 
massively constrained by a determined political alternative.  
Stated more broadly, the problem of defeating toxic hegemony boils down to the disaggregation of 
the alliance underlying it, and the construction of an incipient alternative hegemony, an alternative 
strategy supported by various social actors. Some of these will be “outsiders”, previously the objects 
of coercion; others will be social groups who have been detached from the previously-hegemonic 
alliance (such as trade unions reconsidering their support for growth at any price).  
This paper explores the politics of challenging toxic hegemony in relation to two specific movement 
experiences. One is the conflict in the Niger Delta, in particular that within Ogoniland since around 
1990; the other the conflict in Erris, NW Irelandiii since around 2001iv. The two conflicts are on very 
different scales: in Ogoniland a population which has grown from perhaps 500,000 in the early 1990s 
to 750,000 – 1 million today (Owens Wiwa, pers. comm.) is affected by a plethora of oil and gas 
projects, part of a wider complex of struggles over the petroleum resources of the Niger Delta, home 
to many different ethnic groups and part of a complex and corrupt Nigerian state. The population of 
Erris is small (under 10,000 in total) and remote, and at present facing a single pipeline project – 
although the refinery may well be intended as a central node for future oil and gas drilling off the 
coast, and the conflict has served as a trial ground for resisting fracking elsewhere in Ireland and 
drilling for oil off the cities of Dublin and Cork.  
In both cases, however, a (relatively) small and marginal population has paid the price for living 
where the bulk of a state’s known petroleum reserves are located; in both cases, too, a notoriously 
corrupt state whose citizens are poor while the powerful collude with the wealthy. The results are 
situations where security forces apparently have carte blanche.  
The key moment in Ogoniland was the execution, by the then military regime, of MOSOP leader Ken 
Saro-Wiwa and eight other activists (Birnbaum 1995), during a campaign of repression which saw 
troops shoot demonstrators, extrajudicial executions, widespread rapes, the destruction of villages 
and mass displacements of population (Human Rights Watch 1995, Corby 2011); the full total of 
deaths is unclear but estimates range up to 2,000. In recent years Shell settled out of court for over 
$15 million with the families of those executed, while court and Wikileaks documents have 
demonstrated the broader connections between Shell and the Nigerian state during this period. In 
Erris, too, it was Shell’s use of court injunctions to secure the jailing of 5 locals for 94 days for 
resisting access to their lands for an experimental high-pressure gas pipeline which gave the 
movement an international profile; Shell’s private security, along with Irish state forces of the Irish 
state, have been repeatedly accused of serious violations of human rights (Flood 2009). 
Both movements are currently ongoing; or rather these conflicts are undecided. In 1993, Shell was 
declared persona non grata by MOSOP in 1993; it subsequently left Ogoniland and its ownership was 
handed over to the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation in 2011, with a somewhat higher share 
of petroleum proceeds now going to Ogoniland. The Nigerian dictatorship itself fell in 1999v; but 
conflicts in the Niger Delta continue (Agbonifo 2011) and Ogoni challenges to Shell in international 
courts remain in the news.  
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Similarly in Erris the fact that a project approved in 2001 has still not been completed 13 years on is 
remarkable internationally (Helge Ryggvik, pers. comm.); repression has cost the Irish state dearly in 
terms of legitimacy, most recently when a student researcher recorded police joking about raping 
protestors; and much effort has gone into ensuring that what has been learned in Erris will be 
shared by communities now facing fracking projects across Ireland’s west midlands (Grassroots 
Gathering 2012). 
The two movements are linked, by the loose solidarity and information networks of the international 
anti-Shell and anti-petroleum campaign, but also by a long-standing use of the Ogoni conflict by the 
self-identified “Bogoni” of Erris, who have made the anniversary of the 1995 executions a central 
point of political memory. Here the role of Sr Majella McCarron, one-time solidarity worker in 
Nigeria and recipient of Saro-Wiwa’s final letters before his execution (Corley et al. 2013), has been 
particularly important. 
Exploring these two, linked campaigns, their successes and limitations and their future possibilities 
offers a concrete alternative to de-politicised, purely economic or ecological analysis and to ask what 
might need to be the case for David to defeat Goliath. This article explores three aspects of the 
questionvi.  
Firstly, how can we understand the political strategies of toxic hegemony; more specifically, why do 
resource-weak states make so much effort to hand over resources to multinationals? Similarly, what 
can be said about attempts to construct social movement alliances for an alternative future in this 
context? 
Secondly, I focus on repression and its management, which is a central aspect of both conflicts and 
one where issues of legitimacy, coalition-building and -breaking are particularly visible. How can we 
understand the particular forms repression takes in toxic hegemony, and why do movements 
sometimes achieve successes despite seemingly overwhelming odds? 
Finally, what does all this mean for the broader chances of winning? Can these histories of struggle 
offer wider hope: is it possible to even imagine delegitimizing the petroleum industry, building an 
effective counter-hegemonic alliance, and ultimately asserting popular control of energy strategies? 
Or should we say, with Žižek, that it is easier to imagine the end of life on earth than “a much more 
modest radical change in capitalism”? 
 
 
I. Understanding toxic hegemony 
It is commonly held (Ryggvik 2010) that petroleum creates a “resource curse”. As a large-scale 
natural “windfall”, whose profits are out of all proportion to the scale of labour or investment 
needed (Ryggvik 2009), securing control of petroleum resources promises immense rewards. 
Powerful actors therefore concentrate their efforts on doing so. The resources possessed by the 
main petroleum corporations are larger than those possessed by most states; a point made 
particularly visible in Nigeria, where court documents have recently shown that military units 
operating in the Niger Delta were funded and actions instigated by Shell (Guardian 2011). In Ireland, 
matters work somewhat differently: the state has itself paid vast sums to police Erris, including 
deploying the navy to “protect” the world’s largest pipelaying vessel from protestors in kayaks; but 
the main hard evidence of corporate financing of repression to date is the bizarre story of 
contractors told to reward police with €35,000 worth of alcohol, which came to light when the 
contractors sued Shell for unpaid invoices (Vulliamy 2013). 
More importantly, perhaps, petroleum profits are so large that Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha’s 
personal wealth could run into the billions of dollars without this driving corporations away (the 
more so as not all this wealth can be attributed to corporate corruption). In Ireland, things 
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sometimes operate at a less grandiose scale. Ray Burke, the minister who signed away the state’s 
royalties and its share in offshore oil and gas to the petroleum companies – in a private meeting and 
against the advice of his civil servants – became the only Irish minister ever to serve a prison 
sentence for corruption, yet the sums in relation to which he was convicted (not around petroleum 
access) were a mere £35,000. The scale of profits from oil and gas need not mean that the profits 
from corruption are correspondingly large. 
Either way, with corrupt and weak states, securing natural resources for corporate benefit entails 
that the often economically and politically marginal populations concernedvii suffer ecological 
degradation of their economic resource base (fresh water, sea fishing, land) as well as health costs, 
disrupted development and repression. The vast bulk of Nigeria’s GDP and virtually all its export 
revenue are generated in the Niger Delta, where less than a quarter of the population lives. On the 
national scale, inequality grows between those elites who can secure some portion of the petroleum 
revenues and the rest of societyviii.  
To give a sense of the scale of this: at time of writing a severe austerity programme imposed on 
Ireland by the IMF / WB, European Central Bank and European Commission is seeking to remove 
€3bn a year in successive budgets and reduce a national debt of €137bn. The official estimate of the 
value of petroleum reserves off Ireland’s west coast alone (exclusive of offshore reserves elsewhere 
and fracking possibilities) is €750bn (Shell to Sea 2012). Thus resource-cursed states see a massive 
concentration of wealth in the hands of corporations, the personal enrichment of a small, neo-
comprador elite, and the relative impoverishment of the bulk of the population. “Toxic hegemony” 
underwrites capitalism at its most poisonous, literally and figuratively. 
Yet corruption alone cannot be a sufficient explanation: it is a mechanism but, as the largely non-
corrupt Norwegian example shows, it is not inevitable. Irish and Nigerian politics are not inherently 
crooked; states, elites and individuals choose (or seek) to become so and may or may not receive 
offersix.  
 
Instrumental and non-instrumental explanations 
Classic Marxist discussions of the state contrast instrumental and non-instrumental  approaches 
(Miliband and Poulantzas 1976). In one, the state is the “executive committee of the bourgeoisie”; 
its personnel, elected officials and civil service alike, are drawn from the service class and the petty 
bourgeoisie (only occasionally large-scale capitalists); there is a revolving door between high-level 
elected and civil service positions and roles in major corporations; close family and friendship ties 
are normal; and so on.  
In the other, the state is capitalist because (whatever the social origins of its office-holders) it has to 
secure its own long-term interests through an economic alliance with capital (with at times some 
freedom of choice as between different fractions of capital) – an alliance which is central not only to 
its tax take (and therefore survival) but also to its strategic interests and relative position vis-à-vis 
other states. 
Corruption is, perhaps, a subset of the instrumental theory of the state: it is the private interests of 
its office-holders which lead it to side with corporations. Of course it is often or usually the case that 
office-holders can be bribed; that they have personal connections with corporate wealth; and that 
they see what is good for Big Oil as good for the state. This “overdetermination” may be a good 
explanation of why it is rare for states not to fall in linex.  
In Ireland, such corruption is regularly seen as endemic (Byrne 2012, Transparency 2012). Ray 
Burke’s conviction has already been mentioned. Other members of the Fianna Fáil party, most 
commonly in power in Ireland, have been the target of corruption investigations, particularly Charlie 
Haughey, regularly prime minister between 1979 and 1992 and his loyal supporter Bertie Ahern, 
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prime minister from 1997 - 2008. More recent politicians in the same tradition may now come under 
investigation for their role in the guarantee to private banks which provoked Ireland’s debt crisis. 
An instrumental theory of the state, with less personal corruption, might more schematically be 
associated with Ireland’s other main right-wing party, Fine Gael, to explain why Enda Kenny, the 
current prime minister from Mayo, has consistently supported Shell; or why minister for justice Alan 
Shatter, with a distinguished past in civil liberties, should have publicly intervened to defend the 
police around the “rape recordings” mentioned earlier. Along with their (non-instrumental) views 
about what might benefit the state, elite members are in any case prone to see things as other elite 
actors do. 
The non-instrumental theory of the state is important, however, in understanding how and why 
parties which are critical when out of power (not simply flying populist kites), have their origins in 
social movements and whose members often come from non-elite backgrounds so readily change 
their colours around petroleum once in power. This is true for many of the leaders of the first 
generation of independence movements in Africa and Asia; it also holds for members of the Irish 
Green Party and Labour Party, who were supportive of the Erris campaign while in opposition and 
loyal members of the toxic alliance while in government – or, in the case of Mayo human rights 
campaigner Mary Robinson and the campaign’s erstwhile supporter Michael D Higgins, vocal 
Presidents on many issues but silent on Errisxi. 
Nonetheless, while we can distinguish cases which are more plausibly explained by personal 
corruption, by class sympathies, or by commitment to the actually-existing state, commonly all three 
overlap, among state elites supportive of the petroleum industry even if not always in the same 
individuals; and it is rare to find a combination of factors that would actually lead to internal 
conflicts, let alone a state acting in the interests of society (although the Norwegian example 
reminds us that it can happen).xii  
Finally, perhaps, we should distinguish the non-instrumental theory of the state from the official 
proposition that supporting the petroleum industry is in fact the best thing to do in the interests of 
society as a whole. This is one of the key claims challenged by social movements, and the ultima 
ratio regum deployed against them indicates the state’s vulnerability here: beneficial to elites in 
various ways, the petroleum industry is usually bad news for society as a whole, but the state 
(democratic or otherwise) draws its legitimacy from a claim to be acting in the best interests of 
society, and must therefore demonstratively punish those who effectively challenge this claim, 
whether by executions and reprisals in the Niger Delta, by public violence and private intimidation in 
Erris, or otherwise. 
Indeed one of the first journalistic demolitions of the Irish state’s relationship to the petroleum 
companies (Connolly 2005) – was followed in short order by a leak from the minister for justice and 
the claim that Connolly posed a threat to the state. This was sufficiently effective to cause Chuck 
Feeney’s Atlantic Philanthropies to withdraw funding from Connolly’s Centre for Public Inquiry. More 
recently, but with fewer repercussions, a report by Ireland’s largest trade union SIPTU (2011) 
updated Connolly’s challenge to Irish petroleum policy and called for a thorough-going review; while 
a recent doctoral thesis by Amanda Slevin (2013) has done much the same academically.  
If at an intellectual level there is no serious argument that the Irish state’s subservience to the 
petroleum industry is good for Irish society, the broader hegemonic alliance underpinning the 
relationship between state elites and the oil multinationals remains politically important. This plays 
itself out, as we shall see, around the legitimacy of state violence in Erris and the Niger Delta; it also 
plays itself out around nostalgia for the developmental state.  
If toxic hegemony involves “theoretical and directive leadership” constructed by alliances for growth 
between major corporations and states, this leadership is consented to by a wide range of subaltern 
groups who see (some of) their needs as met by these energy strategies, and entails the coercion of 
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other groups. It represents an alliance between currently-dominant “fractions of capital” and 
elements of the state, supported to some degree by other such fractions and elements out of a 
mixture of interest politics and legitimacy, which posits the extraction and production of petroleum 
products by private interests as central to the national interest. More or less enthusiastic support is 
given by other “consenting” groups – organised as consumers (car and energy users in particular); as 
right-wing opinion politics (hostile to environmentalism, ideologically in favour of capitalism etc.); as 
uncritical popular demands for development; as growth-centric trade unions; and so on. 
 
Social movement alliances against toxic hegemony 
All this is familiar to ecological movements, which have found that at times these alliances can be 
disaggregated in various ways. Most obviously, popular demands for development can and do 
question who “actually-existing development” benefits (Nilsen 2010) and the uneven distribution of 
its costs (Tovey 1993) and call for a different development; this is characteristic of community-based 
campaigns against extractive industries.  
In the 1980s in Nigeria, environmental movements revolving around the key resources of land, 
water, forests and so on challenged the state and multinational capital and connected this to the 
wider struggle for a people-centred democracy (Obi 2005).xiii Around the same period in Ireland, 
community-based campaigns in Ireland played a central role in opposing multinational development, 
particularly within the chemical industry (Allen and Jones 2009). 
When, as in Ogoniland and Erris, the communities in question identify on cultural (indigeneity) or 
economic (subsistence) grounds as having a way of life directly threatened by the industry, this 
makes for very powerful local mobilizations (Osha 2006). However, in Ireland as in Nigeria, the 
popular memory of developmental nationalisms runs deep and can easily be tapped by populist 
state rhetoric. It is difficult to highlight both the extent to which neoliberal states have abandoned 
national-developmentalist strategies and the extent to which the benefits of these were always 
unevenly distributed at best – in other words to challenge state populism, avoid a purely nostalgic 
politics and argue for a different future. This is perhaps the deepest level on which toxic hegemony 
operates, and challenging it has been fundamental to anti-nuclear power and roads protest 
campaigns, among others. 
More specific identifications – by trade unions of industry with jobs, or by consumers with cars – lie 
somewhat closer to the surface and can be challenged in more specific ways. In Norway, for 
example, critical figures within the energy trade unions have long argued that the best strategy for 
continued employment has been to resist the financialisation and internationalization of Statoil 
(running down a skilled industry in Norway while investing abroad) and to turn the existing skill base 
to good use, not only in decommissioning plants but in tail-end production, continued extraction 
from existing fields with lower profit rates etc. (Ryggvik 2009).  
The argument about roads and public transport is a fairly straightforward one, although its 
effectiveness may depend on the existing level of public transport (the more car-dependent a 
population, the harder to imagine an effective public transport system). Despair about widespread 
“car culture” did not prevent a powerful roads protest movement in Britain (Wall 1999), which in 
turn laid important groundwork for the ecological-left alliances of the global justice movement 
(Flesher Fominaya 2013). 
In terms of opinion politics, the larger-scale argument about climate change is a significant one and 
an interesting battleground in many ways, not least because of the use of mainstream science 
against the industry-funded climate deniers; a situation distinct from both the alternative technology 
challenges to nuclear power and fossil fuel (Eyerman and Jamison 1991) and that of critical scientists 
against official ones. Ytterstad (2011) has done fascinating work on how the struggle between “good 
sense” and “common sense” plays itself out in journalistic and blog discussions here. At the widest 
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level, Neale’s (2008) argument that we must change the world to stop global warming seems less 
welcome than in the 1970s, no doubt both for ideological reasons but also because of the apparent 
prospects for winning both the climate change argument and some actual policy choices. However, 
since the failure of the 2009 Copenhagen summit this is changing. 
Counter-hegemonic alliances entail both the disaggregation of toxic hegemony and the construction 
of alternative linkages, and repression plays a particular role. The indigenous / subsistence character 
of Ogoniland and Erris simultaneously facilitates large-scale and radical community mobilization and 
poses specific challenges in terms of wider alliances. Unlike movements such as the Narmada 
Bachao Andolan or the Zapatistas, neither campaign has focused on transversal alliances with other 
specific campaigns nationally, but rather both have sought (and found) a combination of national-
level allies and international solidarity.  
There is a compelling logic to this, given by the immense concentration of resources and power 
represented by petroleum extraction; it is hard to imagine a movement in this area which does not 
rapidly find itself in a close engagement with the national state, and hence engaging with nationally- 
or internationally-organised actors. In the cases discussed here, these include movements for 
democracy (under the Nigerian military regime) and human rights; socialist and trade union groups; 
republican (Ireland) and indigenous solidarity (Nigeria) movements; and the non-hierarchical / direct 
action left (Ireland) – as well of course as sister campaigns, such as the anti-fracking campaign in 
Ireland or the international alliance of anti-Shell and anti-petroleum campaignersxiv. This highlights 
the potentially strategic nature of such struggles (Cox 2011).  
Part of the difficulty for a counter-hegemonic alliance formation in this context is the diversity of 
goals, most schematically the divergence between groups whose goal is either continued extraction 
for the public good (nationalized or with higher royalties, more state oversight etc.) and groups who 
seek an end to petroleum extraction (on environmental or community / indigenous grounds). Given 
this, opposition to repression provides a very useful bridging mechanism on which all can agree. 
Furthermore, as in the campaigns to support the “Ogoni nine” in 1995 or the “Rossport five” in 2005, 
it enables the subordination of different political viewpoints under the control of those most directly 
affected by repression, and hence the deferring of political conflicts. There are limits to this, and 
neither movement is conflict-free; however holding the alliance together could be far more 
difficultxv. 
Repression also enables the inclusion of groups who might not otherwise have become involved, 
such as literary figures in defence of Ken Saro-Wiwa or feminist groups in opposition to rape culture 
in the policing of Erris. It also opens new arenas for campaigning, as when Norwegians, whose 
national image also involves west-coast fishers and farmers, were horrified to see TV footage of 
police attacks on such groups on behalf of a consortium including Statoil. Thus for a variety of 
reasons, state coercion of those who are not (or no longer) part of the hegemonic alliance and 
movement campaigning around repression are key aspects in terms of the future of toxic hegemony. 
 
II. “Consent armoured by coercion”:  
repressive strategies and movements containing state violence 
The Ogoni and Erris movements have faced what by local standards is strong state repression, 
attempting both directly to coerce insubordinate actors and to retain the consent of subaltern 
supporters of toxic hegemony by redefining socio-economic, environmental and political issues as 
public order problems. In this section I attempt, firstly, to understand the goals and operation of 
state repression in this specific contextxvi; secondly, to assess movements’ strategies of resisting and 
containing such repression. 
9 
 
As Arrighi (1994) notes, corporations rarely control substantial amounts of territory or physical force 
directly for any long period of time (exceptions include the East India Company); more commonly, 
they enter relationships with states which provide the legal and coercive framework within which 
they operate. States and capital, then, operate according to different if compatible logics. As the 
earlier discussion of hegemony implies, “the ruling class” consists of elements of state elites allied to 
fractions of capital, supported to a greater or lesser degree by other elements of both as well as 
wider social groups.  
Such alliances, however, can change: military regimes can be ousted, states can switch their support 
between national and international capital, or between industrial and financial capital, and so on. As 
Norway shows, the chances are very high but not certain that states will enter privileged 
relationships with the petroleum multinationals; and indeed a large number of majority world 
countries have national petroleum corporations set up in opposition to the multinationals, with a 
wide variety of current positions.  
So too with repression: while in the normal course of things the police do more or less what the 
corporations want, there are tensions and complexities which can under some circumstances be 
exploited. Helge Ryggvik (pers. comm.) notes that often the local, middle-management level of an oil 
firm will have close relationships with local political (and, where relevant, police) leaderships. 
Wikileaks files showed Shell managers boasting of their close relationship with various levels of the 
Nigerian state (Guardian 2010), while court documents from the 2009 Ogoni Nine trial show the 
extent to which Shell directly funded military operations in the Niger Delta (Guardian 2011). Under 
these circumstances, it is reasonable to assume that close concertation on a day-to-day level, 
including around repression, is possible.  
However, top management in the multinationals are entirely capable of pulling the rug out from 
under such arrangements, if necessary ruthlessly disavowing local managers who understood 
themselves as acting for their bosses (Helge Ryggvik, pers. comm.) Thus whether for bottom-line 
considerations (transfer of investments elsewhere), PR concerns or dissociation from a regime on 
the way out, such partnerships can be dissolved from the corporation’s side as well as from the 
state’s side, in the event of a significant shift in national politics. 
Elsewhere (ní Dhorchaigh and Cox 2011) I have explored the changing tactics of the Irish police in 
Erris, which followed the imprisonment of the Rossport five (at Shell’s behest, using contempt of 
court proceedings) with a long, openly-avowed “no-arrest policy”, geared to not creating further 
“martyrs” but also conditioned by the police’s own failure to impose their definition of public order 
around anti-capitalist protests in Dublin. During this period, much intimidation and low-level 
violence was engaged in off-camera. More recently, policing has reverted to an overtly aggressive 
approach geared to insisting that the project will be carried out under any circumstances. Thus 
priorities shift from Shell’s PR to tactical policing to state legitimacy: at present, the pipeline is about 
the state’s prestige. 
It should also be noted that repression in Erris is not simply “delivered” by the regular police. 
Members of the Special Branch have been identified at the scene. Shell initially made use of private 
prosecutions; it also has its own security firm, IRMS, which is regularly filmed and photographed 
operating in close collaboration with the police. As Flood (2009) has shown, there are severe 
question marks hanging over this situation: other than generalized brutality, the employment of East 
European fascists and the use of overtly militaristic tropes (such as badges celebrating “Operation 
Glengad Beach”) raise grounds for concern. Finally, to round off this overkill, the conflict has been 
militarized with the use of the Irish navy against protesting fishing boats and kayaks.  
Two issues in particular dramatise these complexities. One is the shooting of an Irish member of 
IRMS in Bolivia, who according to Bolivian police was involved in planning secessionist violence 
(Flood 2009). The other, in this intensely-policed area, where there are routinely more security and 
police officers than protestors, was the vicious assault by a group of masked men which hospitalised 
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a well-known local protestor, an assault apparently carried out with impunity within the Shell 
compound, followed by the sinking of another leading protestor’s boat by masked and armed men. 
 
Containing repression: challenging hegemony 
It is small wonder that report after report – most recently from Frontline Defenders (Barrington 
2010) and from a UN special rapporteur (Sekaggya 2013) - have raised concerns about the situation 
in Erris. Even the Garda Ombudsman Commission (GSOC, which between 2007 and 2009 acted on 
precisely 7 of 111 complaints) at one point requested permission to carry out a general investigation 
into the policing of protest in Erris (permission was refused and the subject was dropped). 
GSOC played a particular role in relation to the recording previously discussed. Available with a 
transcript at, this was recorded accidentally when a student carrying out research with the campaign 
was arrested and her bag, with her recording device still running, put in a separate police car. With 
characteristic ineptitude, the bag was handed back to her after her release without charge; she 
subsequently discovered the recording of police officers discussing the use of threats to rape and 
deport protestors. This recordingxvii highlighted a policing culture geared to the use of rape threats 
both against women directly and (in other reports) against the female partners of male activists. The 
story caused a number of women’s organizations to openly protest: following a period in which they 
had celebrated being able to deliver training to the police around issues such as rape, sexual 
harassment and domestic violence, it transpired that actual policing was far removed from the polite 
noises made in the classroom context. 
In this situation, GSOC chose to target the complainant, demanding possession of the recording 
device (which of course contained confidential research data), refusing all attempts at mediation 
(and deletion of the research data under mutually acceptable circumstances), it carried out lengthy 
and hostile interrogations not only of the complainant but also of a trade union representative who 
had accompanied staff when the device was handed over, threatened criminal proceedings over the 
eventual deletion of the data and released an interim report riddled with inaccuracies (Hederman 
2012).xviii  
If the response from the campaign team and the complainant’s supervisors forced an eventual 
climbdown, in which a GSOC spokesperson defensively claimed to have been doing what they 
thought was the right thing, the details were by this point unlikely to affect anyone who was still 
keeping up. However the wider public had been forced to take sides on the recording itself, no 
doubt interpreting it in light of personal experience of the police, scandals around institutional 
sexual abuse and the wider extent of sexual violence in Irish society. 
As so often, such battles over the state’s “monopoly of legitimate force” are fought out in various 
arenas and at different levels: legal and quasi-legal proceedings such as complaints procedures; 
mainstream media reporting at technical and opinion level; and activist and alternative media such 
as Indymedia, one of the key locations for the release of the recording. State and commercial media, 
which would hardly have publicised the recording independently, were forced to acknowledge its 
existence and publish edited transcripts once the recording had “gone viral” via social media 
networks – in turn of course amplifying its resonance.  
Another important level is that of international solidarity and the international media. Following the 
filming of the baton charge mentioned earlier, Norwegian media paid particular attention to events 
in Erris. British media, notably the Guardian, can report more openly on events in Erris than an Irish 
media which is largely owned by the State or by major corporations whose owners themselves have 
investments in Irish oil and gas projects. On a wider scale still, the international anti-Shell campaign 
plays an important role in researching and sharing informationxix. 
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Movements can rarely choose their terrain when resisting repression: they experience (much against 
their will) specific transgressions by police and other repressive forces which in some cases may 
become public issues. Their technical capacity to pursue such issues – documenting events, creating 
their own media, effectively addressing the mainstream media, and using official and semi-official 
fora such as courts – is an important determinant of their “reach”, in particular in reaching subaltern 
members of the hegemonic alliance (and in convincing senior members that particular kinds of 
repression, or an entire project, cost more than they are worth in terms of legitimacy). 
 
III. Conclusion: consent, legitimacy and the wider picture 
This section briefly considers the wider picture of movements against the industry and asks about 
their chances of success beyond the local. 
Movement critiques of repression are one of the most readily-understood challenges to the 
petroleum industry and toxic hegemony per se. For a range of reasons, particularly but not only in 
the global North, the exercise of lethal violence has become a risky strategy (Cox forthcoming) and 
the use of deniable third parties and various forms of offstage intimidation and sublethal violence 
have become routine, tending however to motivate rather than demobilise campaigners. All of this 
makes repression a potentially effective (if personally costly) battleground for movements against 
petroleum projects. 
However, there is a great difference between winning a battle and winning the war, for both sides. 
For movements, winning a specific battle against a particular petroleum project may simply mean 
raising the costs (and hence lowering the profits) to the point where internal accounting 
mechanisms will lead the firm (or, in the case of “midge” firms, investors) to transfer resources 
elsewhere. This may satisfy some community concerns but does not change the wider picture. 
From the other side, high-profile anti-petroleum movements risk raising not only the costs but also 
the implementation time to unsustainable levels. This is part of what happened both with the UK 
government’s roads-building programme in the 1990s and with nuclear power more generally in 
much of the global North from the 1980s on: although the state could not afford to be seen to be 
defeated in the most high-profile conflicts, the conclusion was drawn that such projects were no 
longer feasible because of the level of resistance which could be expected. 
These considerations seem most relevant to national states and to the “midge” firms which often 
carry out the initial explorations (and are often bought out by the major corporations if they find a 
major field). Major petroleum corporations can afford to absorb costs which still remain miniscule by 
comparison with the profits (although as noted they may shift to other sites with even higher profit 
rates); however they too are caught by the logic of extending time costs; and there is good reason to 
believe that the politics of climate change will shift over time. 
On the movement side, the challenge is to convert alliances made around particular projects or in 
response specifically to repression to more general “movement projects” (Nilsen and Cox 2013), in 
other words to construct a broader counter-hegemonic alliance against toxic hegemony and for a 
more sustainable future. Here there are two different possibilities.  
One is represented by the current state of the Niger Delta, where resource-based conflicts have as 
yet not come together fruitfully: opposition to the state and extractive industries is widespread, but 
neither alliance-building nor a future strategy are evident on the wider scale. Indeed MOSOP stands 
out in the context of Delta movements as a truly popular mass movement aiming to secure popular 
control of this wealth, which did not simply reproduce the state’s own practices of violence 
(Neocosmos 2011).  
The other is represented by the relationship between the Erris and anti-fracking campaigns in 
Ireland, where much effort has gone into identifying what has been learnt in Erris (not least about 
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relationships between communities and solidarity activists, but also in convincing people that they 
cannot rely on local clientelist politics to prevent unwanted petroleum developments) and making 
links with the new campaigns.  
This too has its limits in that the stakes are larger, as the issue of climate change reminds us. As with 
the nuclear power industry in previous decades, an adequate challenge to the petroleum industry 
today has to be on a much wider scale to everything represented by “toxic hegemony”. At its 
simplest, infinite growth (the presupposition of contemporary capitalism and central to petroleum-
based strategies) is simply not possible on a finite planet. This becomes clearer the closer the limits 
to growth are approached: climate change; ecologically destructive projects such as Keystone XL and 
oil production in Arctic seas; resource conflicts as in the Niger Delta and basic commodities passing 
out of the reach of significant social groups.  
An adequate answer has to involve reorganising not only production but also consumption, as part 
of the reshaping of popular needs involved in a new, alternative and ecologically sustainable 
hegemony. This cannot sensibly be conceived of as separate from practical politics and in particular 
social movements: put simply, we have to change the world to save the planet (Neale 2008). The 
failure of earlier strategies organised primarily along theoretical (Red-Green Study Group 1995) or 
party-political (Kemp et al. 1992) lines does not make the challenge any less significant; it does, 
however, point to the need for closer attention to issues of collective popular agency in building the 
right alliances and undermining others (Barker et al. 2013, Flesher Fominaya and Cox 2013). 
 
Coda 
In June 2012, Shell brought their vast tunnel boring machine into Dublin port under cover of 
darkness. Despite a large-scale police operation activists blockaded and pursued it across the 
country until, wonderfully, the enormous object found itself stuck in a bog in Co. Mayo (“v. tired 
camper” 2012). Donal O’Kelly’s one-man play Ailliliú Fionnuala highlighted the absurdity of the 
moment: there are not only natural limits to what the planet can take but corporations themselves – 
for all the powers we attribute to them – are “only human”; they rely on workers carrying out 
mundane tasks which are easily disrupted, state violence which can be contested and constrained, 
and a wider political context which social movements can challenge. As Raymond Williams observed, 
the chances of success usually remain about 50-50 once we have thought through everything; or in 
other words, David still has a decent chance against Goliath. 
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i Thanks are due to Tomás MacSheoin and two anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier version. 
ii Gramsci’s broader conception of hegemony applies to a regime of accumulation as a whole; here I apply it to 
the strategically central subset of energy and resource politics, in particular petroleum. 
iii This conflict has become identified with Rossport, the townland (rural district) initially at the centre of the 
conflict; Rossport is one of several townlands in the Erris peninsula of Co. Mayo affected by the conflict. I use 
“Rossport” in the title but “Erris” in the text. 
iv The key organisations have been MOSOP (Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People) and S2S (Shell to 
Sea) respectively; in both cases a wide range of other actors form part of the movement. 
v On the wider relationship between ethnic movements and democratisation, see Olayode 2011.  
vi For the Irish situation, I draw on the limited relevant literature and long-standing involvement in Irish social 
movements; for Nigeria, on the somewhat more developed literature while avoiding comment outside my 
own area of understanding. 
vii In Ogoniland, indigenous ethnic minorities in a largely subsistence economy; in Erris, small-scale fishing and 
farming with high unemployment and a handful of other occupations such as tourism, schools etc. 
viii Ireland is one of the most unequal countries in western Europe, with notoriously high levels of state 
corruption and clientelist power relations. It is this, rather than (as ministers sometimes claim) some unique 
physical disadvantage vis-a-vis Norway, which has shaped Ireland’s response to oil and gas: a long-standing 
political commitment to enticing multinationals at any cost, coupled with the determination of local elites to 
secure small-scale advantages as middlemen in what has been called a “meet-and-greet” capitalism (McCabe 
2011), and the defeat and subordination of popular social movements (Cox 2011). 
ix As Biodun Jefiyo notes, those who could not be bought were a real problem: “One military dictator, Ibrahim 
Badamasi Babangida, defined the true Nigerian this way: Every Nigerian had a price and all you had to do was 
to find the right price; if however you found a Nigerian who had no price and could therefore not be bought, 
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he or she was not a true Nigerian and had to be carefully watched. Another military dictator, Sani Abacha, had 
a far more sinister take on this matter: Every Nigerian had a price; any woman or man that had no price and 
could not be bought was not a Nigerian and had to be jailed or killed or both.” (Jefiyo 2013) 
x In the Norwegian case the role and politicization of social democracy in this period was such as to install not 
just a sense of personal integrity but also officials from non-elite backgrounds, with a different understanding 
of who the state should serve. Organised class politics, in other words, is key to successfully challenging toxic 
hegemony. 
xi A more “Irish” view would be to say that they did what they were told without even having to be bribed to 
do so, simply because they became convinced it was the right thing to do for “the country”. 
xii More typical, no doubt, is the situation illustrated by the Irish magnate who could boast of his ability to 
secure the exploration blocks he wanted thanks to his newspaper ownership (Connolly 2006). 
xiii For wider overviews of contemporary social movements in sub-Saharan Africa, see the Journal of Asian and 
African Studies special issue, “Political Subjectivities in Africa” 47(5); Dwyer and Zeilig 2012; Larmer 2010; 
Brandeis and Engels 2011; Manji and Ekine 2012; and Neocosmos 2010.  
xiv Being organised nationally can create other difficulties. Irish environmental organisations are often happy to 
talk about Erris abroad, it being the main environmental issue reported internationally – but are only too 
aware that they risk permanent loss of the state funding on which most rely if they take a position on it at 
home.  
xv It should be said that state-centric perspectives regularly overestimate the importance of movement “unity” 
(always a polite fiction); good cop-bad cop is quite an effective organising approach so long as the 
“reasonable” participants do not actively collaborate in criminalising other activists. Dalby (1985) shows how 
the existence of three separate campaigns against nuclear power in Ireland did not stop the campaign winning. 
xvi On wider changes in the policing of protest under neoliberalism, see Scholl 2012, della Porta et al. 2006 and 
Cox forthcoming. 
xvii Available with a transcript at http://www.wsm.ie/c/garda-corrib-rape-pipeline. 
xviii I was involved as one of the student’s supervisors. 
xix Pommerolle (2010) rightly notes that internationalisation has costs as well as benefits; but few movements 
facing repressive regimes have failed to appeal to movements and opinion abroad. 
